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Abstract
Random objects arrive sequentially and must be divided among a fixed set of n agents upon arrival:
the distribution µ of the profile of utilities is IID across periods, but arbitrary across agents. We consider
a class of online division rules that take, as an input, only the realized utility profile, and from µ the
individual expected utilities. They have no record from past realized utilities, and do not know either if
and how many new objects will appear in the future. We call such rules prior-independent.
A rule is fair if each agent, ex ante, expects at least 1/n-th of his utility for the object if it is a good,
at most 1/n-th of his disutility for it if it is a bad. Among fair prior-independent rules to divide goods
(bads) we uncover those collecting the largest (lowest) total expected (dis)utility. There is exactly one
fair rule for bads that is optimal in this sense. However, for goods the set of optimal fair rules is one
dimensional. Both in the worst case and in the asymptotic sense, our optimal rules perform much better
than the natural Proportional rule (for goods or for bads), and not much worse than the optimal fair
prior-dependent rule that knows the full distribution µ in addition to realized utilities.
1 Introduction
Motivation: combining fairness and efficiency in online problems A rule to allocate resources in an
intertemporal context is online1 if the allocation taking place in each period relies only on the information
available at this particular time and possibly on the record of past allocations, but not on any precise
expectations about the future periods.
The existing literature is focused on achieving only one of the two objectives: either economic efficiency or
fairness. However, most of the real problems need both: think of a dispatcher distributing randomly arriving
customers across a fleet of taxis, or more generally, to a fixed set of specialists serving the customers one at
a time. For efficiency, she wishes to assign customers where they generate the most benefit, while fairness
requires that each member of the cooperative be guaranteed a significant share of total business. Online
allocation rules may well be the only feasible rules here. Symmetrically, the online distribution of workloads
is compelling if we send emergency care patients to different hospitals, refugees to various shelters and so
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MSE in Paris, University of Rochester, and HSE St. Petersburg are gratefully acknowledged. Remarks of William Thomson
and Yossi Azar were especially helpful. The project benefited from numerical simulations by Yekaterina Rzhewskaya, PhD
student at the HSE St. Petersburg. We thank Lillian Bluestein for the help with proofreading.
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for Basic Research, and by the European Research Council (ERC) under the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and
innovation programme (grant agreement n◦740435).
1 The term “online” originates in the computer science literature: online algorithms deal with sequences of requests that
emerge dynamically and are not known in advance [8].
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on. Here the concern is to minimize costs while making sure no one receives an unduly large burden of
tasks. See more examples in the literature review.
Our goals are:
• Finding the most efficient rules given fairness as a constraint. If the object is a desirable “good”
the design goal is to maximize the expected Relative Utilitarian Welfare while ensuring that each
participant receives a Fair Share of the resources: that is, an agent’s expected utility is no less than
1
n -th of his expected utility for the full object.
2 If the object is a non-disposable “bad” (chore) we
wish symmetrically to minimize total relative disutility while ensuring that no one gets to cover more
than a fair share of the chore.
• Understanding how the performance of the rule depends on the amount of statistical information avail-
able. Since acquiring the information about the prior distribution is potentially difficult and/or costly,
it is desirable to have rules that use possibly less information while providing good efficiency and
fairness guarantees.
In order to achieve these ambitious goals, we make the simplifying assumption that objects (goods or bads)
are IID across periods: they arrive one at a time and the random profiles of individual utilities are inde-
pendent and identically distributed across periods (but typically not across agents) according to some prior
distribution. Upon arrival, an object must be divided (physically, or by means of a lottery if it is indivisible)
between a fixed set of agents.
Our results: prior-independent rules are almost as good as prior-dependent We compare two
extreme cases with respect to the information available to the rule:
— History-Independent rules that know only one simplest statistic of the prior: the expected utility level
of each agent. These rules can be treated as prior-independent within the class of distributions with fixed
expectations or Prior-Independent for short.
— Prior-Dependent rules: the best rules that an omniscient manager – with full knowledge of the past
and the best available statistical information about the future – can design.
One could expect that the performance of fair prior-independent rules must be low compared to that of
prior-dependent. Surprisingly the difference is small. In the first group of results we construct fair prior-
independent rules with the highest welfare (our Top Heavy and Bottom Heavy rules for goods and for bads,
respectively); the second group of results demonstrates that these rules are close by performance to optimal
prior-dependent. This provides a strong argument in favor of the history- and prior-independent rules: they
are simple and easier to implement as they eschew the potentially difficult and/or costly acquisition and
processing of complex information and are also robust to modeling assumptions.
Optimal History- and Prior-independent Fair rules: Top Heavy and Bottom Heavy.
Equal split rule is the simplest way to ensure Fair Shares (FS). It is easy to guarantee FS and achieve a
much higher total relative (dis)utility than Equal Split does. The simplest method is the Proportional rule,
where the probability that an agent gets the good (resp. bad) is proportional (resp. inversely proportional)
to her relative utility (resp. disutility): Proposition 1 from Section 2.
Many other prior-independent rules guarantee FS, and some of them have a better performance than
the Proportional one. Our main results, Theorems 1 and 2 in Sections 3 and 4, describe the optimal
ones. Optimality here is the following (strong) ex-post statement: if a prior-independent division rule
ϕ guaranteeing FS is not optimal, there is at least one optimal rule ϕ∗ such that, in every realization of
2This mild and uncontroversial test of fairness goes back to the earliest modern discussion of fair division by Steinhaus ([23]).
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the profile of relative utilities (for a good), ϕ collects (weakly) less total relative utility than ϕ∗; and the
inequality is sometimes strict. These inequalities are of course reversed for a bad.
The set of optimal prior-independent rules to divide goods is infinite and one-dimensional for n ≥ 3; it
is given in closed form by Theorem 1. We call these rules Top Heavy because they put as much weight on
the agents with high relative utility as permitted by the Fair Shares constraint. For two-agent problems,
and only those, there is a single Top Heavy rule as follows: if the relative utilities of the agents for the good
are x1, x2 and x1 ≤ x2, the shares (y1, y2) are (0, 1) if x1x2 ≤ 12 and (1− x22x1 , x22x1 ) if 12 ≤ x1x2 ≤ 1.
When we divide bads, we speak of a Bottom Heavy rule described in Theorem 2. In contrast to the case
of goods, the Bottom Heavy rule is unique for any number of agents.3
Comparing the optimal Prior-independent and Prior-Dependent rules
First, in Section 5, we use the relevant “worst case” performance index to compare rules. For brevity
call the expected total relative utility collected by a rule for goods, whether prior-independent or prior-
dependent, its relative gain; in the case of bads the relative loss is similarly the expected total relative
disutility collected by the rule.
Fix a prior-independent rule ϕ to divide goods and meeting Fair Shares. Its Competitive Ratio(CR) is
the largest possible ratio of the relative gain of a prior-dependent rule meeting FS, to that of ϕ. If a rule ϕ
(either prior-independent or prior-dependent) meets FS, its Price of Fairness (PoF) is the largest ratio of
the optimal relative gain unconstrained by FS4 to the relative gain of ϕ. The CR and PoF for bads are given
by inverse ratios. We observe first that the two indices CR and PoF coincide for any prior-independent
rule, for goods or for bads: Lemma 1.
Proposition 4 looks at the division of goods. Between two agents (n = 2), the CR=PoF of the Propor-
tional rule is 121%, that of the Top Heavy rule is 109%, and the PoF of the best prior-dependent rule is
108%. As n grows, the PoF of the best prior-dependent rule grows as
√
n
2 , see [9]; this is also the growth
rate of the PoF for the Proportional rule and for some of the Top Heavy rules (for other TH rules, the rate
is faster). This rate is much slower than n, which is the CR=PoF of the Equal Split rule, the worst possible
among all prior-independent rules meeting FS.
In Proposition 5 we divide bads. Between two agents, the CR=PoF of Equal Split is unbounded, that of
the Proportional rule is 2, but for the optimal Top Heavy rule it is 112.5%, exactly like the PoF of the best
prior-dependent rule. As n grows, the CR=PoF of the Proportional rule is n, the CR=PoF the optimal
Bottom Heavy rule increases as n4 , just like the PoF of the best prior-dependent rule.
In Section 6, we discuss asymptotic probabilistic results, assuming that individual (dis)utilities are
statistically independent and drawn from familiar distributions: uniform, exponential, etc. While the worst-
case results of Section 5 show that fairness becomes extremely costly for large n, in the setting of Section 6
the Top Heavy and Bottom Heavy rules collect, independently of n, a constant fraction of the maximal
relative gain (or minimal relative loss) bounded away from zero. For example, when n is large the maximal
gain is only 132% more than the gain captured by the Top Heavy rule for the uniform distribution and 288%
for the exponential.
We conclude that the collection of detailed statistical information in our simple fair division problem
brings little utilitarian gain, when compared with the performance of the prior-independent rules we discov-
ered: the best prior-dependent rule typically garners not much more utilitarian surplus than the best fair
prior-independent rule. This conclusion translates to history-dependent prior-independent rules5 as well.
Such a rule can improve upon history-and-prior-independent rules but cannot outperform the best prior-
3For other unexpected differences between the fair division of goods and that of bads (recall the uniqueness of the Bottom-
Heavy rule and multiplicity of optimal Top Heavy rules), see [6] and [7].
4Obtained by dividing any object only between the agents with the highest utility.
5A history-dependent prior-independent rule may learn something of the underlying distribution from the past allocations.
Optimal rules in this full-fledged online context appear to be quite complicated.
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dependent rule in an IID environment. Therefore, dependence on history gives only a tiny improvement
over our history-independent Top Heavy (for goods) and Bottom Heavy (for bads) rules.
Literature review Problems of dynamic (online) resource-allocation have attracted some attention in
the computer science and economic communities, but the literature is still sparse.
An early and influential reference on the efficiency aspect of online resource allocation is [19] in the
matching context; follow-up work include [14], and [13]. The fairness aspect was touched only recently.
In the food bank problem of [1], like in our setting, objects are arriving online and are allocated to a
fixed population of agents, under a fairness constraint and toward the efficiency objective. Thanks to the
simplifying assumption that agents have dichotomous preferences, i.e., they either “like” or “dislike” the
kind of food delivered right now, the space of possible rules is finite-dimensional and they find some with
appealing properties. In the algorithmic paper [2] agents have additive valuations over indivisible objects and
fairness is achieved without lotteries by a complicated derandomization technique; the resulting algorithm
provides no welfare guarantees.
The study of a “dual” setting where the resources to allocate are known in advance but agents arrive
online was initiated by the model of online fair cake-cutting of [25]. The division of a single unit of durable
resource (unlike here) between agents randomly arriving and departing is discussed in [15] and [16], where
the goal is to maintain approximate fairness while disrupting the allocation of as few agents as possible in
each period. When allocating several computational resources in a cloud among different clients [17] it is
natural to assume agents have Leontief preferences (they need CPU and memory in a given proportion):
online algorithms ensuring fairness for such preferences are constructed by [20]. Then [5] discusses the case
of additive preferences.
In economics, the impact of changing the set of agents entitled to a share of a fixed bundle of resources
has been discussed extensively since [24] in the static and deterministic version of fair division.
Our approach to online fair division is methodologically close to the design of prior-independent [12]
and prior-free auctions [18] and the applications of robust-optimization to contract theory [10]. There, as
here, in contrast to the classical Bayesian approach where the designer knows the prior distribution, either
no information about prior is available at all or it is known that the prior belongs to a certain wide class of
distributions. Hence the optimal worst-case behavior becomes the design objective.
Measuring the trade-off between fairness and the utilitarian objective by the Price of Fairness (PoF) was
suggested by [9] and [3] in the context of offline cake cutting and bargaining, respectively. A similar idea of
comparing online and offline rules (the latter with full information about the future and the past) by the
worst-case ratio of collected welfare is known as competitive analysis [8].
2 The model
Definitions 1 to 6 apply to the division of a good or a bad.
Definition 1 A fair division problem P = (N,µ,X) is described by the fixed set N of n agents, the
probability distribution µ ∈ ∆(RN+ ), and the random variable X in RN+ with distribution µ. We always
assume that the expectations Eµ(Xi) are bounded and positive for each i.
We interpret Xi, i ∈ N , as agent i’s random utility or disutility for the object realized at a certain
period. We impose no additional restriction on the probability space or the distribution of X: (dis)utilities
Xi may be arbitrarily correlated across agents.
We write Xri =
1
Eµ(Xi)Xi for agent i’s relative utility or disutility. The relative (dis)utility is an important
tool of normative economics going back to the concept of Egalitarian Equivalence [22, 11]. Interpersonal
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comparison of absolute (dis)utilities is not always meaningful, but comparing relative (dis)utilities always
is.
We assume that upon the arrival of each object, the corresponding profile of relative (dis)utilities,
Xr = Xri , i ∈ N , is revealed: it is the input of our division rules. In other words, the rule learns how lucky
or unlucky each agent would be to receive the object that just appeared.
Definition 2 A (prior-dependent) division rule ϕ is a collection of measurable mappings ϕµ : RN+ → ∆(N),
one for each prior distribution µ. Given a division problem P = (N,µ,X) and a realization xr ∈ RN+ of the
relative (dis)utility profile Xr, agent i gets the share ϕµi (x
r) of the object.
Here “dividing the object” can be interpreted either literally if the object is divisible, or as assigning
probabilistic shares, or time shares.
Definition 3 A division rule ϕ is prior-independent6 if it does not depend on µ, i.e, ϕµ = ϕµ
′
for all
distributions µ and µ′. For prior-independent rules we will drop the superscript µ.
We focus on those rules that treat agents similarly, i.e., satisfy symmetry.
Definition 4 A rule is symmetric if a permutation of the agents permutes their shares accordingly.
The fairness constraint of our division rules sets a lower (resp. upper) bound on every agent’s expected
utility (resp. disutility).
Definition 5 The division rule ϕ guarantees Fair Shares (FS) if every agent’s expected (dis)utility is at
least (at most) 1n -th of his expected (dis)utility for the entire object.
If the object is a good, this means for each division problem P and each agent i ∈ N
Eµ(ϕµi (X
r) ·Xi) ≥ 1
n
Eµ(Xi). (1)
The inequality is reversed if we divide a bad.
Our design goal, conditional upon meeting Fair Shares, is to maximize the expected relative utilitarian
welfare ∑
i∈N
Eµ(ϕµi (Xr) ·Xi)
Eµ(Xi)
in case of a good, or to minimize this quantity in case of a bad.
Definition 6 We call the problem P normalised if Eµ(Xi) = 1 for all i ∈ N .
In the rest of the paper, it is very convenient and causes no confusion to restrict attention to such
problems, where absolute and relative (dis)utilities coincide. All proofs are given for normalised problems
and extend automatically to general problems by replacing everywhere Xi by X
r
i =
1
Eµ(Xi)Xi.
2.1 Three benchmark prior-independent rules
If S ⊆ N we use repeatedly the notation zS =
∑
j∈S zj , and e
S for the vector eSi = 1 if i ∈ S and eSi = 0 if
i /∈ S. Finally x y means xi > yi for all i.
The Equal Split rule, ϕes(x) = 1ne
N for all x, is the simplest prior-independent rule of all, and it
implements Fair Shares. Not surprisingly its utilitarian performance is poor.
On the other extreme, we have the Utilitarian rule ϕut(x) = e
S
|S| , where S = {i ∈ N : xi = maxj∈N xj}
for a good and S = {i ∈ N : xi = minj∈N xj} for a bad. This rule achieves the optimal welfare level by
allocating the object among agents with highest (lowest) (dis)utilities. However, it drastically violates FS:
in a two-agent normalized problem with a good, where X = (1, 1 + ε) with probability (1 − ε) and (1, ε)
6If X is observable while Xr is not, then, for a prior-independent rule, we must additionally know E(Xi), i ∈ N . In this case,
by calling a rule prior-independent, we abuse terminology since we still need a collection of simple statistics of the prior.
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with probability ε, the expected utility of the first agent E
(
ϕut1 (X)X1
)
= ε is below his fair share of 12 for
any ε ∈ (0, 12).
A natural compromise between these two rules is the Proportional rule which is defined as
for a good: ϕproi (x) =
xi
xN
, if x 6= 0, and ϕpro(0) = e
N
n
for a bad: ϕproi (x) =
1
xi∑
j∈N
1
xj
, if x 0, and ϕpro(x) = e
S
|S| , where S = {i ∈ N : xi = 0} 6= ∅.
The next proposition shows that the Proportional rule also guarantees FS and generates a higher relative
welfare than ϕes in the following strong ex-post sense.
Definition 7: Fix two prior-independent rules ϕ and ψ. We say that ϕ dominates ψ if it always collects,
ex-post (for every realization of the relative utilities) at least as much utilitarian surplus, and sometimes
strictly more. Formally, in case of a good∑
i∈N
ψi(x) · xi ≤
∑
i∈N
ϕi(x) · xi for all x ∈ RN+ , with a strict inequality for some x. (2)
In case of a bad, the inequalities are reversed.
Proposition 1 The Proportional rule guarantees Fair Shares and dominates the Equal Split both for a good
and for a bad.
Proof. A good. Suppose P is normalised. To prove FS, apply the Cauchy-Schwartz inequality to the two
variables
X2i
XN
and XN : Eµ
(
X2i
XN
)
·Eµ(XN ) ≥ (EµXi)2. Now the left-most expectation is simply Eµ(ϕproi (X) ·
Xi), agent i’s expected utility, while by the normalisation the other two terms are respectively n and 1. The
condition of domination is equivalent to xNn ≤
∑
i∈N x
2
i
xN
and follows from the inequality between arithmetic
and quadratic means: xNn ≤
√∑
i∈N x
2
i
n .
A bad. Agent i’s expected utility under ϕpro is now Eµ (ϕproi (X) ·Xi) = Eµ
(
1∑
j∈N
1
Xj
)
= 1nEµ(X˜), where x˜
denotes the harmonic mean of the xi-s. FS then follows from the inequality x˜ ≤ xNn between harmonic and
arithmetic means and the domination boils down to the inequality. 
For a good, there are utility profiles x where
∑
i∈N ϕ
pro
i (x)·xi∑
i∈N ϕ
es
i (x)·xi = n, while for a bad the ratio
∑
i∈N ϕ
es
i (x)·xi∑
i∈N ϕ
pro
i (x)·xi
can be arbitrarily large. Indeed, it is enough to take x = e1 for a good and x = εe1 + eN1, where ε is
arbitrarily small, for a bad.
One can try to improve efficiency of the Proportional rule in our utilitarian sense, by assigning proba-
bilities to agents in proportion (or inverse proportion) to some strictly higher power q > 2 of their relative
(dis)utilities but such rules fail FS.7 In the next section we construct fair prior-independent rules with higher
performance than ϕpro.
3 Goods: the family of optimal prior-independent rules
Our first main result (Theorem 1 below) describes the set of undominated prior-independent rules in a sense
of Definition 7.
7 Say we divide a good and µ picks, for each i ≥ 2, the vector xi = e1 + (n− 1)ei with probability 1
n−1 . Then the expected
utility of agent 1 is 1
1+(n−1)q , below
1
n
for n ≥ 3. The proof for a bad is similar.
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3.1 Characterizing fairness for a good
The key step toward Theorem 1 characterizes the restriction imposed by Fair Shares on any prior-independent
rule ϕ. Given a vector x in RN+ , we write its arithmetic average as x =
xN
n .
Proposition 2 The symmetric prior-independent rule ϕ dividing a good satisfies Fair Shares if and only if
there exists a number θ, 0 ≤ θ ≤ 1, such that
ϕi(x) ≥ max
{
1
n
+
θ
n− 1
(
1− x
xi
)
, 0
}
for all i ∈ N and x ∈ RN+ (3)
(where we use 10 = +∞).
Proof
Statement if: Assume the division rule ϕ for a good satisfies (3), that implies
ϕi(x) · xi ≥ 1
n
xi +
θ
n− 1(xi − x) for all x.
For an arbitrary normalised problem P (Definition 4) we have Eµ(Xi−X) = 0 so the inequality (1) follows.
If P is not normalised the random variables Xri define a normalised problem and we are done.
Statement only if: Assume the rule ϕ meets Fair Shares and define the real valued function f(x) = ϕ1(x)·x1.
Symmetry of ϕ implies f(eN ) = 1n . Consider a convex combination in R
N
+ , with an arbitrary number of
terms, such that
∑K
k=1 µky
k = eN . The problem P in which X = yk with probability µk is normalised and
FS implies
K∑
k=1
µkf(y
k) ≥ 1
n
= f(eN )
The convexification g of f at x is g(x) = inf
{∑K
k=1 µkf(y
k)
}
, over all convex combinations such that∑K
k=1 µky
k = x, see [21].
The inequality above says g(eN ) ≥ f(eN ) and the opposite inequality is true by the definition of g, so
g(eN ) = f(eN ). Because g is convex and finite at eN there exists a vector α ∈ RN supporting its graph at
(eN , g(eN )), i.e., such that for all x ∈ RN+ : g(x) ≥ g(eN ) + α · (x− eN ). Therefore,
f(x) = ϕ1(x) · x1 ≥ 1
n
+ α · (x− eN ).
Figure 1: The geometric intuition behind the proof of Proposition 2. Right figure: the convexification of a
function f coincides with f at x = e if the graph of f is supported by a linear function. Left figure illustrates
necessity of this condition.
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Apply the inequality above to x = λeN for any λ > 0. By symmetry of ϕ we get
1
n
λ ≥ 1
n
+ (λ− 1)α · eN for any λ > 0
implying α · eN = 1n ; therefore ϕ1(x) · x1 ≥ α · x for all x.
Again symmetry of ϕ implies that we can take αj = αi for all i, j ≥ 2. Indeed if x′ results from x by
permuting coordinates i, j we have
ϕ1(x) · x1 = ϕ1(x′) · x1 ≥ 1
2
(α · x+ α · x′) = α˜ · x
where α˜i = α˜j and α˜ · eN = 1n is preserved.
Set β = αi for all i ≥ 2 and note that β ≤ 0 because of the inequality x1 ≥ ϕ1(x) · x1 ≥ α1x1 + βxN1.
Combining this with α · eN = 1n we see that there is a non-negative constant γ such that
ϕ1(x) · x1 ≥ α · x = 1
n
x1 + γ((n− 1)x1 − xN1)
Changing the parameter γ to δ = nγ gives
ϕi(x) ≥ 1
n
+ δ
(
1− x
xi
)
for all i ∈ N and x ∈ RN+
It remains to find the bounds on γ derived from the fact that ϕ(x) is in ∆(N). For all x  0 the
inequality above and ϕ(x) ≥ 0 imply∑
i∈N
max
{
1
n
+ δ
(
1− x
xi
)
, 0
}
≤ 1 for all x ∈ RN+ (4)
which is equivalent to the following property:
for all S ⊆ N :
∑
i∈S
1
n
+ δ
(
1− x
xi
)
= |S|
(
1
n
+ δ
)
− δx
(∑
i∈S
1
xi
)
≤ 1 for all x ∈ RN+
The infimum of x(
∑
i∈S
1
xi
) is |S|
2
n , achieved for any x parallel to e
S ; therefore
|S|
(
1
n
+ δ
)
≤ 1 + δ |S|
2
n
⇐⇒
(
1− |S|
n
)
(δ|S| − 1) ≤ 0
and we conclude that δ ≤ 1n−1 . This gives the desired inequality (3) by setting θ = (n− 1)δ.
3.2 Optimal rules for a good: the Top Heavy family
Armed with Proposition 2, it is now easy to identify the undominated prior-independent division rules
(Definition 7) meeting FS for goods.
For any x ∈ RN+ we write x∗ = (x∗1, · · · , x∗n) for the order statistics of x,8 and τ(x) = {i ∈ N |xi = x∗n}
for the set of agents with the largest utility.
We fix θ, 0 < θ ≤ 1 and define the Top Heavy rule ϕθ by placing as much weight on the agents from
τ(x) as inequalities (3) permit.
8The vector with the same set of coordinates as x, rearranged in increasing order.
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Definition 8: For 0 < θ ≤ 1 the Top Heavy (TH) rule ϕθ is given by
ϕθi (x) =

max
{
1
n
+
θ
n− 1
(
1− x
xj
)
, 0
}
, i ∈ Nτ(x)
1
|τ(x)|
1− ∑
j∈Nτ(x)
ϕθj(x)
 , i ∈ τ(x) (5)
Inequality (4) guarantees that the highest share above is non-negative. It also implies that the i-sequence
of shares ϕθi (x) is co-monotonic with that of utilities xi.
9
The rule ϕθ converges to Equal Split when θ goes to zero, but Equal Split is clearly dominated by any
rule ϕθ for θ > 0. This is why we excluded 0 from the range of θ.
Note that all rules ϕθ are discontinuous at any x where at least two agents have the highest utility
(x∗(n−1) = x∗n).
Example: the TH rule ϕ1 for n = 2. For two agent problems the rule ϕ1 has a simple expression. By
symmetry it is enough to define it when x1 ≤ x2:
ϕ1(x) =
{
(0, 1), x1x2 ≤ 12(
1− x22x1 , x22x1
)
, 12 ≤ x1x2 ≤ 1
(6)
The dependence of ϕ11 on
x1
x2
is depicted on Figure 2.
Figure 2: The amount of a good received by the first agent under the TH rule ϕ1 for two agents as a function
of the ratio t = x1x2 . If the ratio is below
1
2 or above 2, the TH rule coincides with the Utilitarian one, which
gives the whole good to an agent with the highest value. If the relative values are closer, both agents receive
a non-zero amount of the good: ϕ1 = 1− 12t on
[
1
2 , 1
]
and ϕ1 =
1
2 t on [1, 2].
Theorem 1 (for goods)
i) If n = 2 the Top Heavy rule ϕ1 dominates every other symmetric prior-independent rule meeting Fair
Shares.
ii) If n ≥ 3: every symmetric prior-independent rule meeting Fair Shares is dominated by, or equal to, one
Top Heavy rule ϕθ, 0 < θ ≤ 1; the Top Heavy rules themselves are undominated.
iii) For n ≥ 3, the Proportional rule is dominated by the Top Heavy rule ϕn−1n , but not by any other rule ϕθ.
9This is clear if we compare the shares of two agents i, k outside τ(x) ; if i /∈ τ(x) and k ∈ τ(x) inequality ϕθi (x) ≤ ϕθk(x) is
|τ(x)|ϕθi (x) +
∑
j∈Nτ(x)
ϕθj (x) ≤ 1
which follows from ϕθi (x) = max{ 1n + δ(1− Exxi ), 0} and (4).
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Proof
Statement i) Fix θ < θ′ and x1 ≤ x2. The formula (5) implies ϕθ1(x) ≥ ϕθ
′
1 (x) because the coefficient of θ
in ϕθ1(x) is
1
2(1 − x2x1 ) ≤ 0. Therefore ϕθ2(x) ≤ ϕθ
′
2 (x) and inequality (2) follows; both can be strict as well.
Note that this argument does not extend to the case n ≥ 3 because if agent i’s utility is neither the smallest
nor the largest, the sign of the coefficient of θ in ϕθi (x) is ambiguous.
Thus ϕ1 dominates ϕθ for θ < 1. The fact that it also dominates other prior-independent rules meeting
FS follows from the proof of Statement ii).
Statement ii) Fix a prior-independent rule ϕ satisfying FS. There is a θ, 0 ≤ θ ≤ 1, s. t. the inequalities
(3) hold for all i and x (Proposition 2). If θ = 0, our rule is Equal Split, which we already noticed is
dominated by each rule ϕθ. If θ > 0, these inequalities imply ϕi(x) ≥ ϕθi (x) for all x and all i /∈ τ(x).
Hence (ϕi(x) − ϕθi (x))xi ≤ (ϕi(x) − ϕθi (x))x∗n for all i /∈ τ(x). Summing up these inequalities and adding∑
j∈τ(x)(ϕi(x)−ϕθi (x))xj on both sides gives the desired weak inequalities in (2). If none of the inequalities
in (2) is strict, we deduce ϕi(x) = ϕ
θ
i (x) for all x and all i /∈ τ(x) s. t. xi > 0. If there is some i s. t. xi = 0
and ϕi(x) > 0 (while ϕ
θ
i (x) = 0) then ϕ(x) has less weight to distribute on τ(x) than ϕ
θ, contradicting our
assumption. Because ϕ is symmetric, we conclude ϕ(x) = ϕθ(x).
We check now that no TH rule ϕθ dominates another TH rule ϕθ
′
. Assume 0 < θ < θ′ and consider first
the profile xi =
3
4 if i 6= n and xn = 1 + n−14 . Then x = 1 and all coordinates of ϕθi (x) and ϕθ
′
i (x) are strictly
positive. Compute ϕθi (x)−ϕθ
′
i (x) =
θ′−θ
3(n−1) > 0 for all i 6= n, so that ϕθ
′
collects more surplus at x than ϕθ.
To show an instance of the reverse comparison, we choose x1 =
θ
3 , xi = 1 +
3
4
− θ
3
n−2 for 2 ≤ i ≤ n− 2, and
xn =
5
4 . Thus x = 1 and x < xi < xn for 2 ≤ i ≤ n − 2. This implies ϕθ1(x) = ϕθ
′
1 (x) = 0, ϕ
θ
i (x) < ϕ
θ′
i (x),
and ϕθn(x) > ϕ
θ′
i (x).
Statement iii) In the previous proof we showed that the rule ϕ is dominated by ϕθ if it satisfies inequalities
(3). Thus the rule ϕpro is dominated by the TH rule ϕ
n−1
n if for all x ∈ RN+ we have
x21
xN
≥ 1
n
+
1
n
(
1− x
xi
)
⇐⇒ x
2
1
xN
+
xN
n2
≥ 2
n
x1
and the latter inequality is easily checked.
To check for instance that ϕpro is not dominated by the TH rule ϕ1, we pick a profile x = (0, a, a, · · · , a, b)
in RN+ such that a < b and
ϕpro2 (x) =
a
(n− 2)a+ b < ϕ
1
2(x) =
1
n
+
1
n− 1
(
1− (n− 2)a+ b
na
)
.
If a = 2, b = 3, then ϕpro puts less weight than ϕ1 on each xi, 2 ≤ i ≤ n − 1, and more on xn = b. The
argument for other values of θ is similar. 
4 Bads: the unique optimal prior-independent rule
We adapt the approach developed in the previous section in order to characterize the undominated (Defini-
tion 7) prior-independent rules for a bad guaranteeing Fair Shares.
Surprisingly, in case of a bad, the dominating rule turns out to be unique even for n ≥ 3 and the
construction becomes more complicated than for a good.
4.1 Characterizing fairness for a bad
The following proposition is an analog of Proposition 2 about goods and its proof can be found in Ap-
pendix A.
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Proposition 3 The symmetric prior-independent rule ϕ dividing a bad satisfies Fair Shares if and only if
there exists a number θ, 0 ≤ θ ≤ 1, such that
ϕi(x) ≤ min
{
1
n
+
θ
n− 1
(
x
xi
− 1
)
, 1
}
for all i ∈ N and x ∈ RN+ (7)
(where we use 10 = +∞)
4.2 Optimal Bottom Heavy rule for a bad
We can now use inequality (7) to construct, as in the previous section, the canonical Bottom Heavy rule ϕ1,
which corresponds to θ = 1. The construction relies on the same order statistics x∗, but is slightly more
involved. We write σ(x; t) = {i ∈ N | xi = x∗t} (so σ(x;n) = τ(x)) and use the convention x∗0 = −∞ and
σ(x, t) = ∅ for t > n.
The BH rule places as much weight on the smallest disutilities as permitted by (7). For θ = 1, the
right-hand side of (7) can be simplified as 1n +
θ
n−1(
x
xi
−1) = 1n(n−1)
xNi
xi
and we get the following expression.
Definition 9: The Bottom Heavy (BH) rule ϕ1 is defined by
ϕ1i (x) =

1
n(n− 1)
xNi
xi
, i : xi ≤ x∗t˜
1
|σ(x; t˜+ 1)|
1− 1
n(n− 1)
∑
i:xi≤x∗t˜
xNi
xi
 , i ∈ σ(x; t˜+ 1)
0, otherwise
(8)
where t˜ is the maximal t = 0, 1, 2..n such that 1n(n−1)
∑
i:xi≤x∗t
xNi
xi
≤ 1.
Note that for all vectors x except those parallel to eN the sum 1n(n−1)
∑
i∈N
xNi
xi
> 1 and thus t˜ ≤ n−1.
Indeed, the minimum of
∑
i∈N
xNi
xi
over RN+ is n(n− 1), and is achieved by any x parallel to eN , and only
by those: for such a vector, t˜ = n and ϕ1(x) = e
N
n .
If t˜ = 0 the only agents with a positive share are those in σ(x; 1), who have the smallest disutility, so ϕ1
selects an optimal utilitarian allocation.
Analogously to the case of goods, the sequence of shares ϕ1i (x) is anti-monotonic to the sequence of
disutilities xi.
Example: the BH rule ϕ1 for two agents. If n = 2, the BH rule ϕ1 for bads is the mirror image of the
dominant TH rule ϕ1 (6):
ϕ1(x) =
{
(1, 0), x1x2 ≤ 12(
x2
2x1
, 1− x22x1
)
, 12 ≤ x1x2 ≤ 1
Theorem 2 (for bads) For any n ≥ 2, the Bottom Heavy rule ϕ1 dominates every other symmetric
prior-independent rule for bads meeting Fair Shares.
The proof of Theorem 2 proves more difficult than in the case of goods, see Appendix A. There we define
a family of BH rules ϕθ, θ ∈ [0, 1] and first show, as in the case of goods, that any other rule is dominated
by some ϕθ and then check that ϕ1 dominates ϕθ for θ < 1.
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Figure 3: The share of the first agent under the BH rule ϕ1 for two agents as a function of x1x2 .
5 Worst-case performances
Notation. We write Φ for the set of symmetric prior-dependent rules ϕ, Φ(FS) for rules ϕ ∈ Φ meeting
Fair Shares, and Φind(FS) for the set of symmetric prior-independent rules ϕ meeting FS. So Φind(FS) ⊂
Φ(FS) ⊂ Φ. Next Πn is the set of normalised problems with n agents. Finally the relative gain (or loss) of
a rule ϕ ∈ Φ for a good (a bad) in a problem P ∈ Πn is
pi(ϕ,P) = Eµ
(∑
i∈N
ϕµi (X) ·Xi
)
.
Definition 10 The Competitive Ratio10 (CR) of a prior-independent rule ϕ ∈ Φind(FS) is
a good: CRn(ϕ) = sup
P∈Πn
sup
ψ∈Φ(FS)
pi(ψ,P)
pi(ϕ,P) a bad: CRn(ϕ) = supP∈Πn
sup
ψ∈Φ(FS)
pi(ϕ,P)
pi(ψ,P)
The CR identifies the worst-case loss in welfare caused by prior-independence.
For a good, the utilitarian performance of the rule ϕ ∈ Φ(FS) at a problem P is the ratio of the optimal
unconstrained relative gain achieved by the Utilitarian rule to the gain collected by ϕ. For a bad, it is the
ratio of the relative loss generated by ϕ to the optimal relative loss:
a good: UP (ϕ,P) = Eµ (maxiXi)
pi(ϕ,P) a bad: UP (ϕ,P) =
pi(ϕ,P)
Eµ (miniXi)
.
The Price of Fairness (PoF) of ϕ ∈ Φ(FS) is its worst-case utilitarian performance
PoFn(ϕ) = infP∈Πn
UP (ϕ,P) ≥ 1.
Lemma 1 If the prior-independent rule ϕ ∈ Φind(FS) divides a good, we have
CRn(ϕ) = PoFn(ϕ) = sup
x∈RN+
maxi xi∑
i∈N ϕi(x) · xi
10Usually the competitive ratio for online problems is defined as a worst-case ratio of the gain of an online rule to the gain of
the best “offline” one, which has a full knowledge of the future.
Our definition can also be interpreted in this fashion: knowing the future means knowing the empirical distribution of the
future sequence of values, which in an IID environment with a large number of repetitions converges to the prior. Thus the best
“offline” rule becomes just the best prior-dependent.
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If ϕ ∈ Φind(FS) divides a bad, we have
CRn(ϕ) = PoFn(ϕ) = sup
x∈RN+
∑
i∈N ϕi(x) · xi
mini xi
Proposition 4 (for goods)
i) The CRn of any rule ϕ ∈ Φind(FS) is at most n; the CRn of Equal Split is exactly n.
ii)The CRn of the Proportional rule is
√
n
2 +
1
2 ; for instance 121% for n = 2.
iii) The CRn of the Top Heavy rule ϕ
θ is decreasing in θ. Moreover:
CRn(ϕ
1) =
n
2
√
n− 1 =
√
n
2
+
1
4
+O
(
1√
n
)
CRn(ϕ
θ) =
n
2
√
(n− 1 + θ)θ + 1− 2θ ≥ CRn(ϕ
1)
For instance CR2(ϕ
1) ' 109% for n = 2.
iv) The smallest PoFn of a prior-dependent rule in Φ(FS) is such that
n
2
√
n− 1 ≥ infϕ∈Φ(FS)PoFn(ϕ) ≥
n
2
√
n− 12
=
√
n
2
+
1
8
+O
(
1√
n
)
For n = 2 it is 108%.
Statements iii) and iv), together with Lemma 1, make clear that the PoFn of the TH rule ϕ
1 is essentially
the best CRn of any fair prior-dependent rule.
Proposition 5 (for bads)
i) The CRn of Equal Split is unbounded (for any fixed n); that of the Proportional rule is n;
ii) The CRnof the Bottom Heavy rule ϕ
1 is such that
n
4
+
5
4
≥ CRn(ϕ1) ≥ n
4
+
1
2
+
1
4n
It is 109% for n = 2.
iii) The smallest PoFnof a prior-dependent rule in Φ(FS) is
inf
ϕ∈Φ(FS)
PoFn(ϕ) =
n
4
+
1
2
+
1
4n
For n = 2 it is 108%.
Again, the last two statements and Lemma 1 imply that the PoFn of the BH rule ϕ
1 is essentially the
best PoFn of any fair prior-dependent rule.
All three results (Lemma 1 and Propositions 5,6) are proved in Appendix B.
6 Asymptotic performance for standard distributions
We evaluate the utilitarian performance of the TH, the BH, and the Proportional rules in the benchmark
setting, where the number of agents is large and their values are given by independent identically distributed
(IID) random variables.
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Fix a distribution ν ∈ ∆(R+) with unit mean and assume that the vector X = (Xi)i=1,..,n of values is
distributed according to µ = ⊗ni=1ν, i.e., the values are independent random variables with distribution ν.
The corresponding problem Pn(ν) is both normalised and symmetric.
In Appendix C we derive the somewhat cumbersome general formulas describing the utilitarian perfor-
mance UP (ϕ,Pn(ν)) for these three rules when n is large. Here we discuss examples and corollaries of the
general results.
6.1 A good
6.1.1 Bounded support: ν is the uniform distribution on [0, 1].
In this case the TH rule ϕ1 and the Proportional rule ϕpro have similar utilitarian performances.
For n = 2, the TH almost achieves the optimal welfare level. The Proportional rule is 10% behind: simple
computations show that UP (ϕ1,P2(uni[0, 1])) = 85+4 ln 2 ≈ 1.03 and UP (ϕpro,P2(uni[0, 1])) = 2ln 2−1 ≈ 1.13.
Compare these numbers with the worst-case guarantees from Proposition 4: PoF2(ϕ
pro) =
√
2+1
2 ≈ 1.21
and PoF2(ϕ
1) = 2
2
√
2−1 ≈ 1.09. We see that the Proportional rule captures less welfare for the uniform
distribution than the TH rule for any distribution.
For n→∞, Proposition 6 from Appendix C and Lemma 3 below imply that the utilitarian performances
of our two rules converge and the limit values are
UP (ϕ1,P∞(uni[0, 1])) = 11
16 + ln 2
≈ 1.32 and UP (ϕpro,P∞(uni[0, 1])) = 1.5
This result is in sharp contrast with the worst-case behavior (Section 7): there are problems P with n
agents such that the TH rule collects only a 2/
√
n fraction of the optimal relative gain. Our next result
generalizes this observation.
6.1.2 The TH rule keeps a positive fraction of the optimal relative gain.
This holds in general, not just in the above example. Fix a distribution ν with mean 1 and with non-zero
average absolute deviation D(ν) =
∫ |x− 1|dν(x). Note that D(ν) is at most 2.
Lemma 2: If ν has mean 1 and a finite moment
∫
R+ x
βdν(x) < 0 for some β > 2, then the utilitarian
performance of the TH rule converges to a limit value which satisfies the following upper bound
UP (ϕ1,P∞(ν)) ≤ 2
D
+
4
D2
(9)
If in addition ν has unbounded support, then
UP (ϕ1,P∞(ν)) ≥ 1
D
(10)
Proof is in Appendix C. For instance if ν is the exponential distribution we find
UP (ϕ1,P∞(exp)) = 1
1− 2e− 12 − Ei(−1/2)
≈ 2.88
where Ei stands for a special function, the exponential integral. Contrast this with the situation for the
Proportional rule.
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Lemma 3: Under the assumptions of Lemma 2
UP (ϕpro,Pn(ν)) = Eµ (maxiXi)Eν(X1)2 (1 + o(1)), as n→∞
(where an = o(1) means that an → 0, as n→∞).
Indeed, by the law of large numbers
pi(ϕpro,Pn(ν)) = Eµ
(∑
i∈N
Xiϕ
pro
i (X)
)
= n · Eµ
(
(X1)
2∑
i∈N Xi
)
−→ Eµ
(
(X1)
2
EµX1
)
= Eν(X1)2.
Lemma 3 implies that UP (ϕpro,P∞(ν)) tends to +∞ if ν has unbounded support, because Eµ maxiXi
tends to infinity. For instance UP (ϕpro,Pn(exp)) = lnn2 (1 + o(1)).
Of course, this limit is finite if the support of ν is bounded.
6.2 A bad
When a bad is divided, the performance of the BH and the Proportional rules is determined by the behaviour
of the distribution at the left-most point of the support. Both rules generate a bounded multiple of the
optimal relative loss when 0 does not belong to the support of ν; the BH rule does also well when ν has
a non-zero density at 0. However, both rules have poor performance if the support touches 0 but ν has
not enough “weight” near 0. Here we give three examples to illustrate the general asymptotic results of
Appendix C.
6.2.1 The support does not touch zero: ν is uniform on [12 ,
3
2 ].
By Proposition 7 in Appendix C, the utilitarian performances of the BH and the Proportional rules converge
to limit values which are pretty close to each other:
UP
(
ϕ1,P∞
(
uni
[
1
2
,
3
2
]))
= e− 1 ≈ 1.72 and UP
(
ϕpro,P∞
(
uni
[
1
2
,
3
2
]))
=
2
ln 3
≈ 1.82
6.2.2 The support touches zero but there is not enough weight around it: ν has density
3
4x(2− x) on [0, 2].
For this distribution the optimal relative loss tends to zero while the losses of the BH and the Proportional
rules remain positive. Proposition 7 shows that the utilitarian performances of both rules tend to infinity
at the speed of
√
n while their ratio converges to 1√
3
≈ 0.58:
UP (ϕ1,Pn(ν)) = 2
3
√
pi
√
n(1 + o(1)) = UP (ϕpro,Pn(ν)) 1√
3
(1 + o(1))
6.2.3 The distribution has non-zero density at 0 (e.g., ν is uniform on [0, 2]).
In this case, the BH rule outperforms the Proportional one in the limit.
Lemma 4: Assume the distribution ν has a continuous density f on an interval [0, a] and f(0) > 0.
Then UP (ϕ1,Pn(ν)) converges to a finite limit as n becomes large, whereas UP (ϕpro,Pn(ν)) = Ω
(
n
ln(n)
)
as
n→∞.11
11Recall that an = Ω(bn) if there exist n0 and C > 0 such that |an| ≥ C|bn| for all n ≥ n0.
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A similar result for the case when the density is infinite at x = 0 is the subject of Lemma 5 in Appendix C.
The statement about the BH rule follows from the asymptotic result for the order statistic: the expected
values of X∗k for small numbers k are equal to kf(0)·n(1 + o(1)) as n → ∞.12 Therefore, on average only
a bounded number of agents with smallest Xi receive a non-zero portion of a bad, which implies that the
utilitarian performance is bounded away from infinity.
For the Proportional rule, we have pi(ϕpro,Pn(ν)) = n · E
(
1∑
k
1
X∗k
)
. For large n, we can estimate the
denominator from below by the harmonic series; taking into account that E(X∗1) = 1f(0)·n(1 + o(1)) we get
the desired asymptotic formula.
7 Concluding comments
Envy-Freeness An alternative, much more demanding interpretation of fairness in our model is (ex ante)
Envy-Freeness, which means, in the case of a good:
Eµ(ϕµi (X
r) ·Xi) ≥ Eµ(ϕµj (Xr) ·Xi) for all i, j and P = (N,µ,X).
The critical Proposition 2 can be adapted as follows. Set g(x) = (ϕ1(x)− ϕ2(x)) · x1 so that Envy-Freeness
for a symmetric prior-independent rule is equivalent to Eµ(g(X)) ≥ g(eN ) = 0 whenever Eµ(X) = eN , and
deduce in the same way that there is a vector β ∈ Rn such that (ϕ1(x)−ϕ2(x)) · x1 ≥ β · (x− eN ) for all x.
Symmetry of ϕ and ϕ(x) ∈ ∆(N) imply promptly the existence of θ ≥ 0 such that, for any x with weakly
increasing coordinates:
θ
(
1− xi−1
xi
)
≤ ϕi(x)− ϕi−1(x) ≤ θ
(
xi
xi−1
− 1
)
for all i = 1, · · · , n.
Applying this when xi is a geometric sequence with a large exponent gives θ ≤ 2n(n−1) , and by choosing
θ∗ = 2n(n−1) and defining ϕ appropriately, we guarantee a worst-case utilitarian performance of the order of
n, comparable to the minimal Price of Envy-Freeness for prior-dependent rules: [9].
For a bad, Envy-Freeness is defined with the opposite sign in the inequality. Similarly, we find that if
the coordinates of x are weakly increasing, an Envy-Free rule ϕ is such that
θ
(
1− xi−1
xi
)
≤ ϕi−1(x)− ϕi(x) ≤ θ
(
xi
xi−1
− 1
)
for all i = 1, · · · , n
where again the parameter θ is at most 2n(n−1) . However, this time the utilitarian performance of such a
rule is fairly poor, as one can see with θ∗ = 2n(n−1) and the disutility profile xi = 2
i−1 for all i. The most
efficient profile of shares is then ϕi(x) = (n− i)θ∗ and the ratio 1x1 (
∑n
1 ϕi(x)xi) is then in the order of
2n
n2
!
Asymmetric ownership rights If the agents are endowed with unequal ownership rights on the object,
captured by the shares λ ∈ ∆(N), it is natural to adapt Fair Shares as follows (for goods): Eµ(ϕi(Xr) ·Xi) ≥
λiEµ(Xi) for all i. We can again adapt the argument in Proposition 2 to characterize this constraint by
the existence, for each i, of a linear form lower bounding the function x → ϕi(x) · xi. But we cannot use
arguments based on symmetry in order to reduce the number of free parameters and the characterization of
the undominated fair rules is much more difficult.
12The order statistic X∗k has the same distribution as F−1(Y ∗k), where F is the distribution function of ν and Yi, i ∈ N ,
are independent random variables uniformly distributed on [0, 1]. By symmetry, E(Y ∗k) = k
n+1
.
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A Proofs for Section 6
A.1 Proof of Proposition 3
Statement if: The proof is the same as in Proposition 2 for goods, upon reversing inequalities.
Statement only if: Again the proof mimics that of the only if statement in Proposition 2. Fix a prior-
independent rule ϕ meeting FS and define f(x) = ϕ1(x) · x1; by symmetry f(eN ) = 1n . For any coefficients
µ ∈ ∆(K) and convex combination ∑Kk=1 µkyk = eN in RN+ , we apply FS to the normalised problem in
which X = yk with probability µk and obtain
∑K
k=1 µkf(y
k) ≤ f(eN ). Therefore the concavification g of f
coincides with f at eN , and there is some α ∈ RN supporting its graph at (eN , g(eN )), which means
ϕ1(x) · x1 ≤ α · (x− eN ) + 1
n
for all x ∈ RN+
The same symmetry arguments show that α takes the form α = (α1, β, β, · · · , β) and α · eN = 1n . This time
the inequality 0 ≤ ϕ1(x) · x1 ≤ α1x1 + βxN1 implies α ≥ 0. Setting δ = nβ and rearranging we get finally:
ϕi(x) ≤ 1
n
+ δ
(
x
xi
− 1
)
for all i ∈ N and x ∈ RN+ .
Because xxi ≥ 1n the inequality ϕi(x) ≥ 0 holds everywhere if it holds at x = e{i}, and there it implies
the bound δ ≤ 1n−1 . Then the change of parameters θ = (n− 1)δ implies the desired inequality (7).
A.2 Proof of Theorem 2
Step 1. First we define the whole family of Bottom Heavy rules for θ ∈ [0, 1] by
ϕθi (x) =

1
n
+
θ
n− 1
(
x
xi
− 1
)
, i : xi ≤ x∗t˜
1
|σ(x; t˜+ 1)|
1− ∑
i:xi≤x∗t˜
ϕθi (x)
 , i ∈ σ(x; t˜+ 1)
0, otherwise
(11)
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where t˜ is the maximal t = 0, 1, 2, . . . , n such that
∑
i:xi≤x∗t
(
1
n +
θ
n−1
(
x
xi
− 1
))
≤ 1. The definition is
correct since 1n +
θ
n−1
(
x
xi
− 1
)
is always non-negative and
∑
i∈N
1
n +
θ
n−1
(
x
xi
− 1
)
≥ 1 with strict inequality
for x non-parallel to eN and θ 6= 0.
Step 2. Next we prove that if the prior-independent rule ϕ meets inequalities (7) for some θ, 0 ≤ θ ≤ 1,
then ϕθ dominates ϕ or equals ϕ. In Step 3 we show that ϕ1 dominates ϕθ if θ < 1.
First, for θ = 0, inequalities (7) imply that ϕ itself is Equal Split, i.e., ϕ0. From now on, we assume
θ > 0.
Along the ray through eN the rules ϕ and ϕθ coincide by symmetry. Now we fix x ∈ RN+ not parallel to
eN and let t˜ be defined as above. From (7) we get ϕi(x) ≤ ϕθi (x) for all i, s.t., xi ≤ x∗t˜, hence∑
i:xi≤x∗t˜
(ϕi(x)− ϕθi (x))xi ≥
∑
i:xi≤x∗t˜
(ϕi(x)− ϕθi (x))x∗(t˜+1) (12)
Next we have
∑
i:xi≥x∗(t˜+1) ϕ
θ
i (x)xi =
∑
i:xi≥x∗(t˜+1) ϕ
θ
i (x)x
∗(t˜+1) because ϕθi (x) = 0 if xi > x
∗(t˜+1). Thus∑
i:xi≥x∗(t˜+1)
(ϕi(x)− ϕθi (x))xi ≥
∑
i:xi≥x∗(t˜+1)
(ϕi(x)− ϕθi (x))x∗(t˜+1) (13)
Summing up these two inequalities gives the corresponding weak inequality (2).
Assume finally that all inequalities (2) are equalities. If at least one xi is zero, (7) implies that ϕ(x) does
not put any weight outside σ(x, 1), so ϕ(x) = ϕθ(x). If each xi is strictly positive, our assumption implies
that (12) is an equality; but the definition of t˜ implies x∗t˜ < x∗(t˜+1). Therefore ϕi(x) = ϕθi (x) as long as
xi ≤ x∗t˜. Now (13) cannot be an equality if ϕ(x) puts any weight on agents with disutilities larger than
x∗(t˜+1), and we conclude ϕ(x) = ϕθ(x) by symmetry of ϕ.
Step 3. We show that ϕθ
+
dominates ϕθ
−
if θ+ > θ− > 0. We write these rules as ϕ+ and ϕ− for simplicity,
and fix x ∈ RN+ . For ε = +,−, denote t˜ for ϕε(x) by tε.
We use the notation
δi =
1
n− 1
(
x
xi
− 1
)
and ψεi =
1
n
+ θεδi
We prove inequality (2) between ϕ+ and ϕ− for a vector x with no two equal coordinates. This will
be enough because each mapping ϕθ is only discontinuous at x if |σ(x, t˜ + 1)| > 1, and the total disutility∑
i∈N ϕ
θ
i (x)xi is continuous at such points.
Finally we label the coordinates of x increasingly, so that xi = x
∗i for all i, and the definition of ϕε(x)
is notationally simpler: ϕεi (x) = ψ
ε
i > 0 for 1 ≤ i ≤ tε; 0 ≤ ϕεtε+1(x) < ψεtε+1 ; ϕεj(x) = 0 for j > tε + 1.
We claim first t+ ≤ t−, and if t+ = t− = t then λ = ϕ
+
t++1
(x)
ψ+
t++1
< µ =
ϕ−
t−+1(x)
ψ−
t−+1
where 0 ≤ λ, µ < 1. To
prove this we compute
1 =
t+∑
1
ψ+i + λψ
+
t++1
=
t+ + λ
n
+ θ+(δ{1,··· ,t+} + λδt++1)
As t
++λ
n < 1, this implies δ{1,··· ,t+} + λδt++1 > 0; therefore
1 >
t+ + λ
n
+ θ−(δ{1,··· ,t+} + λδt++1)
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However, by repeating the computation above for ϕ−(x) we get
1 =
t− + µ
n
+ θ−(δ{1,··· ,t−} + µδt−+1)
We see that t− < t+ brings a contradiction between the last two statements. Also, if t− = t+ = t they imply
λψ−t+1 < µψ
−
t+1 so λ < µ because ψ
−
i > 0 for all i. The claim is proved.
Now we evaluate the difference ∆ in total disutility collected by our two rules:
∆ =
∑
N
(ϕ+i (x)− ϕ−i (x))xi
=
t+∑
1
(ψ+i − ψ−i )xi + (λψ+t++1 − ψ−t++1)xt++1 −
t−∑
t++2
ψ−i xi − µψ−t−+1xt−+1
where we have assumed t+ < t−; if instead t+ = t− = t the last three terms of the sum reduce to
(λψ+t+1 − µψ−t+1)xt++1. As xi increases in i we have
∆ ≤
t+∑
1
(ψ+i − ψ−i )xi + λψ+t++1xt++1 − (ψ−{t++1,...,t−} + µψ−t−+1)xt++1
and from ϕ+N (x) = ϕ
−
N (x) we get ψ
−
{t++1,...,t−} + µψ
−
t−+1 =
∑t+
1 (ψ
+
i − ψ−i ) + λψ+t++1. Rearranging the
right-hand term in the inequality above, and going back to the definition of ψεi this gives
∆ ≤
t+∑
1
(ψ+i − ψ−i )(xi − xt++1) = (θ+ − θ−)
t+∑
1
δi(xi − xt++1)
We show finally that the right-hand term above is strictly negative, as desired.
The sequence δi is (strictly) decreasing and initially positive. As δ{1,··· ,t+} + λδt++1 > 0, we have
δ{1,··· ,t+} > 0. The sequence γi = xt++1 − xi is positive and (strictly) decreasing. These facts imply
that
∑t+
1 δiγi is strictly positive. Let δi∗ be the first strictly negative term in the sequence δi: we have∑i∗−1
1 δiγi ≥
∑i∗−1
1 δiγi∗ as all terms are non-negative and γi decreases; also
∑t+
i∗ δiγi >
∑t+
i∗ δiγi∗ as δi < 0
and γi < γi∗ . Thus −∆ =
∑t+
1 δiγi > δ{1,··· ,t+}γi∗ .
B Proofs for Section 7
B.1 Proof of Lemma 1
Step 1. For goods. The inequality CRn(ϕ) ≤ PoFn(ϕ) is clear. Next, for any P ∈ Πn, not necessarily
symmetric, there exists some x ∈ RN+ such that
Eµ(maxiXi)
pi(ϕ,P) ≤
maxi xi∑
i∈N ϕi(x) · xi
This proves PoFn(ϕ) ≤ supx∈RN+
maxi xi∑
i∈N ϕi(x)·xi . Now we pick an arbitrary x ∈ R
N
+ and check the inequality
maxi xi∑
i∈N ϕi(x)·xi ≤ CRn(ϕ), thus completing the proof.
Consider the symmetric problem P ∈ Πn that selects each of the n! permutations of 1xx with equal
probability 1n! . By Symmetry of ϕ we have pi(ϕ,P) =
∑
i∈N ϕi(x) · xi. It will be enough to construct a rule
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ψ ∈ Φ(FS) such that pi(ψ,P) = maxi xi, because pi(ψ,P)pi(ϕ,P) ≤ CRn(ϕ). To this end, we note that the utilitarian
rule ϕut violates FS in general (see example in Subsection 2.1) but not if the problem P is symmetric (the
distribution µ is symmetric in all variables xi).
13 Thus, we can pick ψ that is equal to ϕut for symmetric
problems, and meets FS elsewhere.
The similar argument for bads is omitted.
B.2 Proof of Proposition 4
Statement i) Pick ϕ ∈ Φind(FS) and P ∈ Πn. The FS property implies
pi(ϕ,P) =
∑
i∈N
Eµ(ϕi(X) ·Xi) ≥ 1
n
∑
i∈N
Eµ(Xi) ≥ 1
n
Eµ(max
i
Xi)
and the first claim follows. If ϕ is the Equal Split rule, the first inequality above is an equality, and the
second one is an equality if the random variable X is uniform over the coordinate profiles e{i}.
Statement ii) By Lemma 1 we must evaluate supx∈RN+0
∑
i∈N xi∑
i∈N x
2
i
maxi xi. By rescaling x we can assume
x1 = 1 = maxi≥2 xi; then we must show
sup
1 +
∑n
2 xi
1 +
∑n
2 x
2
i
=
√
n+ 1
2
where the supremum is on all x2, · · · , xn ∈ [0, 1]. We omit the straightforward argument.
Statement iii) We fix θ, 0 < θ ≤ 1, set N = {1, · · · , n} and rewrite inequalities (3) as
ϕθi (x) ≥ max
{(
1
n
+
θ
n− 1
)
− θ
n(n− 1)
xN
xi
, 0
}
for all i and x ∈ RN+ .
By Lemma 1 we must evaluate the smallest feasible value of 1x∗n {
∑n
i=1 ϕ
θ
i (x) · xi} in RN+ . This function is
continuous in x (even though ϕθ itself is not at those profiles where several agents have the highest utility)
so it will be enough to compute the infimum of this ratio for profiles x such that xi < xn for all i ≤ n− 1.
We first compute the desired lower bound when ( 1n +
θ
n−1) − θn(n−1) xNxi ≥ 0 for all i, so that all agents
i ≤ n− 1 get exactly this share and agent n gets
ϕθn(x) = 1−
n−1∑
i=1
ϕθi (x) =
1
n
− θ + θ
n(n− 1)
(n−1∑
i=1
1
xi
)
xn + n− 1 +
∑
{i,j}⊂{1,··· ,n−1}
(
xi
xj
+
xj
xi
)
On the right-hand side, if we fix the sum
∑n−1
i=1 xi, the first sum is minimal when all utilities are equal;
the second sum is also minimal and equal to (n− 1)(n− 2) when utilities are equal. It is also clear that for
i, j ≤ n− 1 the sum ϕθi (x) · xi + ϕθj(x) · xj is constant when we equalize xi and xj while keeping their sum
constant. Thus, we can assume that xi = y for 1 ≤ i ≤ n− 1, so that the share of agent n is
ϕθn(x) =
1
n
− θ + θ
n
(
xn
y
+ n− 1
)
=
1
n
(1− θ) + θ
n
xn
y
Then we compute
1
xn
(
n∑
i=1
ϕθi (x) · xi
)
= ϕθn(x) + (n− 1)
ϕθ1(x)
xn
=
1
n
(
(1− 2θ) + θxn
y
+ (n− 1 + θ) y
xn
)
13Indeed, Eµ(X1) ≤ Eµ(maxiXi) = pi(ϕut,P) =∑i Eµ(ϕuti (X) ·Xi) = nEµ(ϕut1 (X) ·X1).
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and the minimum in xn, y of this expression is achieved for
xn
y =
( (n−1+θ)
θ
) 1
2 (which is larger than 1 as
needed) and its value is
1
n
(
(1− 2θ) + 2
√
(n− 1 + θ)θ
)
as stated. Clearly it decreases in θ.
It remains to consider the case where for some i∗ ≤ n− 1 we have, for all i ≤ i∗ − 1 and all j ≥ i∗:(
1
n
+
θ
n− 1
)
− θ
n(n− 1)
xN
xi
< 0 ≤
(
1
n
+
θ
n− 1
)
− θ
n(n− 1)
xN
xj
Observe that if we decrease xi to zero for all i ≤ i∗ − 1, without changing other coordinates, the share
of each agent j, i∗ ≤ j ≤ n − 1, increases (strictly if some xi is positive), while that of agent n decreases;
therefore the ratio 1x∗n {
∑n
i=1 ϕ
θ
i (x) · xi} decreases. Thus, it is enough to assume xi = 0 for all i ≤ i∗ − 1.
Computing the share of agent n and the total utility
∑n
i=1 ϕ
θ
i (x) · xi is then more tedious but very similar,
and the argument that we can assume xi = y for i
∗ ≤ i ≤ n− 1 is unchanged. In turn we find
ϕθn(x) =
i∗
n
(
1− n− i
∗
n− 1 θ
)
+
n− i∗
n(n− 1)θ
xn
y
1
xn
(
n∑
i=1
ϕθi (x) · xi
)
=
i∗
n
− (n− i
∗)(i∗ + 1)
n(n− 1) θ +
n− i∗
n(n− 1)
(
θ
xn
y
+ (n− 1 + i∗θ) y
xn
)
of which the minimum in xn, y is
i∗
n
− (n− i
∗)
n(n− 1)
(
(i∗ + 1)θ − 2
√
(n− 1 + i∗θ)θ
)
and this quantity increases in i∗ because (i∗+ 1)θ− 2√(n− 1 + i∗θ)θ does. Therefore, the worst case is for
i∗ = 1, and we are done.
Statement iv) Clearly infϕ∈Φ(FS) PoFn(ϕ) ≤ infϕ∈Φind(FS) PoFn(ϕ) ≤ PoFn(ϕ1), so the inequality
infϕ∈Φ(FS) PoFn(ϕ) ≤ n2√n−1 follows from Lemma 1 and statement iii).
Next we fix n, p, s.t. 1 ≤ p ≤ n − 1 and consider the problem P(n, p) ∈ Πn with n agents and p
equiprobable states:
utilities:
state ω1 · · · ωp
proba 1/p · · · 1/p
X1 p 0 0
· · · 0 p 0
Xp 0 0 p
Xp+1 1 1 1
· · · 1 1 1
Xn 1 1 1
Let N1 be the set of the p “single-minded” agents and N2 that of the other n− p “indifferent” agents. Fix
an arbitrary prior-dependent rule ϕ ∈ Φ(FS) and write Eµ(Yi) = Eµ(ϕµi (X) · Xi) the expected utility of
agent i.
We call λk the total share ϕ gives to N2 at state ωk. Then Eµ(YN2) = 1p
∑p
k=1 λk and Fair Shares
imply
∑p
k=1 λk ≥ p(n−p)n . If ϕ gives the remaining shares to single-minded agent k in state ωk, then
Eµ(YN1) = 1p
∑p
k=1(1−λk)p = p−
∑p
k=1 λk. This is the best ϕ can do for the utilitarian objective. Compute
Eµ(YN ) =
(
p−
p∑
k=1
λk
)
+
(
1
p
p∑
k=1
λk
)
= p− p− 1
p
p∑
k=1
λk
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≤ p− (p− 1)(n− p)
n
=
p2
n
− p
n
+ 1
=⇒
(
Eµ(maxiXi)
Eµ(YN )
)−1
=
Eµ(YN )
p
≤ p
n
+
1
p
− 1
n
The minimum of pn +
1
p − 1n over real numbers is achieved for p =
√
n, and is worth 2√
n
− 1n = (CRn(ϕ1))−1.
As p is integer and p → f(p) = pn + 1p is convex, the minimum over integers is at most α = max{f(
√
n +
1
2), f(
√
n− 12)}. Routine computations show α ≤ 2√n + 12n ; therefore
(
Eµ(maxiXi)
Eµ(YN )
)−1 ≤ 2√n− 12n and the proof
is complete.
B.3 Proof of Proposition 5
Statement i) If ϕ is the Equal Split rule, then 1mini xi (
∑
i∈N ϕi(x) · xi) = xNn·mini xi for all x ∈ RN+ , and this
ratio is clearly unbounded, so the claim follows by Lemma 1.
Recall that, by the definition, the Proportional rule ϕpro coincides with the utilitarian at any profile x ∈
RN+ with at least one zero coordinate. For x 0 we have 1mini xi (
∑
i∈N ϕ
pro
i (x)·xi) = 1mini xi n∑i∈N 1xi = x˜mini xi
where x˜ is the harmonic mean of the xi. The inequality x˜ ≤ nmini xi is always true, and asymptotically
becomes an equality when x1 = mini xi, and all other coordinates are equal and go to infinity. Therefore,
the CRn(ϕ
pro) is indeed n.
Statement ii) The lower bound follows from the lower bound on infϕ∈Φ(FS) PoFn(ϕ) (statement iii proven
below) and from CRn(ϕ
1) = PoFn(ϕ
1) ≥ infϕ∈Φ(FS) PoFn(ϕ).
To prove the upper bound PoFn(ϕ
1) ≤ n4 + 54 , we fix an arbitrary profile x and majorize
1
mini xi
(
∑
i∈N ϕ
1
i (x) · xi). Because ϕ1 is homogeneous of degree zero and symmetric, and ϕ1 coincides with
the Utilitarian rule if x1 = 0, we can without loss assume x1 = 1 and xi increases weakly in i. We must
bound UN (x) =
∑
i∈N ϕ
1
i (x) · xi. By continuity of UN (x), we can assume that none of the coordinates of x
are equal, i.e., that xi is increasing strictly.
By definition of ϕ1 there exists an index t˜ such that
1
n(n− 1)
t˜∑
i=1
xNi
xi
≤ 1 < 1
n(n− 1)
t˜+1∑
i=1
xNi
xi
and ϕ1i (x) =
1
n(n−1)
xNi
xi
for i ≤ t˜.
We set ∆ = n(n− 1)−∑t˜i=1 xNixi , ∆ ≥ 0, and develop UN (x) as follows
n(n− 1)UN (x) =
t˜∑
i=1
xNi + ∆xt˜+1 = (t˜− 1)
t˜∑
i=1
xi + t˜
n∑
j=t˜+1
xj + ∆xt˜+1
Say we replace each xi, 2 ≤ i ≤ t˜ by their average y = 1t˜−1
∑t˜
i=2, ceteris paribus: this will decrease the
total weight given by ϕ1 to these coordinates, which is xNn(n−1)(
∑t˜
2
1
xi
), and increase the weight to coordinates
xt˜+1 and beyond. Therefore, this move increases UN (x), so we can assume that these t˜− 1 coordinates are
all equal to y. We also set
∑n
j=t˜+1 xj = w. Now we try to bound
n(n− 1)UN (x) = (t˜− 1)(1 + (t˜− 1)y) + t˜w + ∆xt˜+1
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under the constraints
∆ = n(n− 1) + t˜− (1 + (t˜− 1)y + w)
(
1 +
t˜− 1
y
)
≥ 0 ; 0 ≤ ∆xt˜+1 ≤ 1 + (1− t˜)y + w ; w ≥ (n− t˜)y
where the second inequality comes from the fact that ∆ ≤ xN(t˜+1)xt˜+1 and the third one from the fact that the
coordinates of x increase weakly. These inequalities imply
n(n− 1)UN (x) ≤ t˜(1 + (t˜− 1)y) + (t˜+ 1)w
(1+(t˜−1)y+w)
(
1 +
t˜− 1
y
)
≤ n(n−1)+ t˜ =⇒
(
1 +
t˜− 1
y
)
w ≤ n(n−1)−(t˜−1)
(
y +
1
y
)
+(t˜−1)−(t˜−1)2
=⇒ w ≤ (n(n− 1) + t˜− 1) y
y + t˜− 1 − (t˜− 1)y
Combining w ≥ (n− t˜)y and the upper bound above gives
(n− t˜)y ≤ (n(n− 1) + t˜− 1) y
y + t˜− 1 − (t˜− 1)y =⇒ y + t˜− 1 ≤ n+
t˜− 1
n− 1 ≤ n+ 1
Next we combine the upper bound on n(n− 1)UN (x) with that on w:
n(n− 1)UN (x) ≤ t˜(1 + (t˜− 1)y) + (t˜+ 1)(n(n− 1) + t˜− 1) y
y + t˜− 1 − (t˜+ 1)(t˜− 1)y
= t˜− (t˜− 1)y + (t˜+ 1)(n(n− 1) + t˜− 1) y
y + t˜− 1
We now majorize the upper bound above in the two real variables t˜, y such that y+t˜ ≤ n+2. Observe first that
this bound increases in y because its derivative has the sign of (t˜+1)(n(n−1)+t˜−1)
(y+t˜−1)2 − 1 and
(t˜+1)(n(n−1)+t˜−1)
(y+t˜−1)2 ≥
3(n2−n+1)
(n+1)2
. Thus, we can take y + t˜ = n and use the inequality t˜+1n+1 ≤ 1 to deduce the bound
n(n− 1)UN (x) ≤ t˜+ n(n− 1)(t˜+ 1)y
n+ 1
+ (t˜− 1)y
(
t˜+ 1
n+ 1
− 1
)
≤ n+ n(n− 1)
n+ 1
(t˜+ 1)(n+ 2− t˜)
The maximum in t˜ of (t˜+ 1)(n+ 2− t˜) is (n+3)24 for t˜ = n+12 ; therefore
=⇒ UN (x) ≤ 1
n− 1 +
(n+ 3)2
4(n+ 1)
=
n
4
+
5
4
− 2
n2 − 1
completing the proof of statement ii).
Statement iii)
Step 1. lower bound on infϕ∈Φ(FS) PoFn(ϕ). Consider the normalised problem P with two equally probable
states ω, ω′, and the corresponding profiles of disutilities
x1 =
4
n+ 1
, xi = 2 for 2 ≤ i ≤ n ; x′1 = 2
n− 1
n+ 1
, x′i = 0 for 2 ≤ i ≤ n.
Without the FS constraint total disutility is minimized by giving to agent 1 the whole bad in state ω, and
no share at all in state ω′, so that Eµ(miniXi) = 2n+1 . The FS constraint caps the share of agent 1 at
n+1
2n
24
in state ω so at least n−12n goes to the other agents and expected total disutility is at least
1
n +
1
2
n−1
2n 2 =
n+1
2n .
Therefore, for any ϕ ∈ Φ(FS) we have
pi(ϕ,P)
Eµ(miniXi)
≥ (n+ 1)
2
4n
=
n
4
+
1
2
+
1
4n
Step 2. upper bound on infϕ∈Φ(FS) PoFn(ϕ). We omit for brevity the proof that the above lower bound is
achieved by the rule in Φ(FS) with the smallest disutility at each P ∈ Πn.14 In any event the upper bound
on PoFn(ϕ
1) in statement ii) applies to infϕ∈Φ(FS) PoFn(ϕ) as well.
C Asymptotic results and missing proofs for Section 8
C.1 A good
Proposition 6 Fix a distribution ν of Xi with EνX1 = 1 and Eν(X1)
β <∞ for some β > 2. Consider a
problem Pn(ν) with n agents and µ = ⊗ni=1ν. Then the utilitarian performance of the TH rule ϕθ, θ ∈ (0, 1],
satisfies
UP (ϕθ,Pn(ν)) = 1
1− Eν
(
1 + θ − θX1
)
+
+
Eν(X1(1+θ)−θ)+
Eµ(X∗n)
(
1 +O
(
1
n
1
2
− 1
β
))
, (14)
for a large number of agents15 n. Here (y)+ denotes max{y, 0}.
Note that the only dependence on n in formula (14) is through the expected value of X∗n = maxi=1,..,nXi
and the error-term.
C.1.1 Proof of Proposition 6
To simplify heavy formulas, we assume that θ = 1 (proof for other values of θ follows the same logic).
By the definition of the TH rule ϕ1 we can represent the relative gain as
∑
i
Xiϕ
1
i (X) =
n∑
i=1
Xi
(
2
n
− XN −Xi
n(n− 1)Xi
)
+
+X∗n
(
1−
n∑
i=1
(
2
n
− XN −Xi
n(n− 1)Xi
)
+
)
= A+X∗n −B.
Consider the contribution of A first. Since all Xi have the same distribution EµA = Eµ
(
2X1 −
∑
j 6=1Xj
n−1
)
+
.
Let us show that ∆0 = Eµ(A)− Eν (2X1 − 1)+ is small. The function ( · )+ is Lipschitz with constant one;
thus by the Cauchy inequality and independence of Xj
|∆0| ≤ Eµ
(∣∣∣∣1−
∑
j 6=1Xj
n− 1
∣∣∣∣) = 1n− 1Eµ
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
j 6=1
(Xj − 1)
∣∣∣∣∣∣

≤ 1
n− 1
√√√√√Eµ
∑
j 6=1
(Xj − 1)
2 = √Vν(X1)√
n− 1 = O
(
1√
n
)
if the variance Vν of X1 is finite.
14It is actually the PoF for a general normalized bargaining set; see the discussion in [3], [4].
15an = O(bn) if there exist n0 and C > 0 such that |an| ≤ C|bn| for all n ≥ n0.
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Now we will check that Eµ(B) is close to Eµ(X∗n) ·Eν ((2− 1/X1)+) (as if X∗ is independent of Xi and∑
Xj approximately equals its expectation). This is done in two steps:
• Step 1: proving that Eµ(B) does not change much if we put (2 − 1/X1)+ instead of (2 −
∑
j 6=1Xj/(n −
1)X1)+.
• Step 2: showing that the random variables X∗n and (2− 1/X1)+ can be decoupled; the expected value of
the product is close to the product of expectations.
Step 1. Proving that
∑
j 6=1Xj/(n− 1) can be replaced by its expectation:
Since Xj are independent and identically distributed we have
Eµ(B) = Eµ
(
X∗n
(
2−
∑
j 6=1Xj
(n− 1)X1
)
+
)
= E
(
X∗n
(
2− 1
X1
)
+
)
+ ∆1,
where
∆1 = Eµ
(
X∗(n)
((
2−
∑
j 6=1Xj
(n− 1)X1
)
+
−
(
2− 1
X1
)
+
))
= Eµ (X∗nh(X))
Consider two cases depending on how far is the sum
∑
j 6=1Xj from its expected value. Let Q be the event
that
∣∣∣∑j Xjn−1 − 1∣∣∣ > 12 , Q its complement, and 1Q, 1Q their indicator functions. Then the probability Pµ(Q) =
E(1Q) is at most 8Vν(X1)n−1 by Markov inequality. Let us represent ∆1 as Eµ (X
∗nh(X)1Q)+Eµ
(
X∗nh(X)1Q
)
.
For the first term, we use the estimate h ≤ 2 and then apply the Cauchy inequality:
Eµ (X∗n|h(X)|1Q) ≤ 2Eµ (X∗n1Q) ≤
√
Eµ (|X∗n|2)
√
Pµ(Q).
To bound the second term, consider the following inequality for y, z ≤ 2: ∣∣|y|+−|z|+∣∣ ≤ (1y≥0+1z≥0)·∣∣y−z∣∣.
Applying it to h we get:
|h(x)| ≤
(
1{
1
x1
≤ 2(n−1)∑
j 6=1 xj
} + 1{ 1
x1
≤2
}
)∣∣∣∣
∑
j 6=1 xj
(n− 1)x1 −
1
x1
∣∣∣∣
For x ∈ Q the function h is non-zero only if 1x1 ≤ 43 . Thus, for such x, we have |h(x)| ≤ 83
∣∣∣∑j 6=1(xj−1)n−1 ∣∣∣ .
Finally we get
Eµ
(
X∗n|h(X)|1Q
)
≤ 8
3(n− 1)Eµ
X∗n
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
j 6=1
(Xj − 1)
∣∣∣∣∣∣
 ≤ 8
3(n− 1)
√
Eµ (|X∗n|2)
√√√√√E
∑
j 6=1
(Xj − 1)
2
Combining all the estimates together, we see that |∆1| = O
(√
Eµ(|X∗n|2)√
n
)
. We will estimate Eµ
(|X∗n|2)
at the end of the proof.
Step 2. Decoupling X∗n and (2− 1/X1)+:
Now we continue with B. We proved that B is close to Eµ (X∗n(2− 1/X1)+). Now we want
to decouple the two factors and show that B is close to Eµ (X∗n) · Eν ((2− 1/X1)+). Define ∆2 =
Eµ(X∗n) · Eν
((
2− 1X1
)
+
)
− Eµ
(
X∗n
(
2− 1X1
)
+
)
. The random variable ξ = maxi=2...nXi is indepen-
dent from
(
2− 1X1
)
+
. Therefore,
∆2 = Eµ(X∗n − ξ) · Eν
(
2− 1
X1
)
+
− Eµ
(
(X∗n − ξ)
(
2− 1
X1
)
+
)
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By the definitionX∗n is greater than ξ. Hence |∆2| ≤ 2Eµ(X∗n−ξ). To estimate the difference of expectations
define X∗n−j as maxk=1,..n, j 6=iXk. Then E(X∗n−j) = E(ξ) for all j. If Xi = X∗n, then all X∗n−j except the
one with j = i coincide and are equal to X∗n. Thus, nE(ξ) = E
(∑
j=1..nX
∗n
−j
)
≥ (n − 1)E(X∗n) and
E(X∗n)− E(ξ) ≤ E(X∗n)n . Finally |∆2| = O
(
Eµ(X∗n)
n
)
.
Let us estimate Eµ ((X∗n)α). For α > 0, we have Eµ ((X∗n)α) = −
∫∞
0 t
αdPµ({X∗n ≥ t}) and integration
by part gives
α
∫ ∞
0
tα−1Pµ({X∗n ≥ t})dt =
∫ T
0
+
∫ ∞
T
.
The first integral does not exceed Tα. To estimate the second one we combine the union bound with
Markov inequality: Pµ({X∗n ≥ t}) ≤ nPν({X1 ≥ t}) ≤ nEν((X1)
β)
tβ
. Therefore,
α
∫ ∞
T
tα−1Pµ({X∗n ≥ t})dt ≤ αnEν
(
(X1)
β
)∫ ∞
T
tα−β−1dt =
α
β − αnEν
(
(X1)
β
) 1
T β−α
for β > α. Optimizing over T , we get Eµ ((X∗n)α) ≤
(
β
β−α
) (
nEν
(
(X1)
β
))α
β = O
(
n
α
β
)
.
It remains to put all pieces together:
∆0 + ∆1 + ∆2 = O
(
1√
n
)
+O
(√
Eµ (|X∗n|2)√
n
)
+O
(
Eµ(X∗n)
n
)
= O
(
1
n
1
2
− 1
β
)
for any β > 2 such that Eν(X1)β <∞. This implies formula (14) for θ = 1.
C.1.2 Proof of Lemma 2
For unbounded distributions E (X∗n) tends to +∞ and thus by Proposition 6 the utilitarian performance
of ϕ1 converges to
(
1− Eν
(
2− 1X1
)
+
)−1
. Thus, the lower bound immediately follows from the inequality
|x1 − 1| ≥ x1 −
(
2− 1x1
)
+
.
For the upper bound, we have(
UP (ϕ1,P∞(ν))
)−1 ≥ Eν (X1 − (2− 1
X1
)
+
)
≥ Eν
((
X1 −
(
2− 1
X1
)
+
)
1{X1≥1}
)
=
= Eν
((
X1 +
1
X1
− 2
)
1{X1≥1}
)
= Eν
((
(X1 − 1)2
X1
)
1{X1≥1}
)
= Eν
(
g(X1)1{X1≥1}
)
,
where 1A stands for the indicator of the event A. In order to relate the expected value of g(X1) to D, we
apply the Cauchy inequality
D
2
= Eν
(|X1 − 1|1{X1≥1}) = Eν
(√
g(X1)1{X1≥1} ·
|X1 − 1|1{X1≥1}√
g(X1)
)
≤
≤
√
Eν
(
g(X1)1{X1≥1}
)√
Eν
(
(X1 − 1)2
g(X1)
1{X1≥1}
)
.
The second factor on the right-hand side can be estimated as follows:
Eν
(
(X1 − 1)2
g(X1)
1{X1≥1}
)
= Eν
(
X11{X1≥1}
)
= Eν
(|X1 − 1|1{X1≥1})+ Eν (1{X1≥1}) ≤ D2 + 1,
which completes the proof.
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C.2 Bads
C.2.1 Not much weight around zero
Proposition 7 Consider a distribution ν such that Eν(X1) = 1 and Eν
(
1
X1
)
< ∞. Then the utilitarian
performance of the BH rule can be represented as
UP (ϕ1,Pn(ν)) = Pν({X1 < T}) + γPν({X1 = T})Eµ (mini∈N Xi) (1 + o(1)), n→∞, (15)
where T > 0 and γ, 0 ≤ γ < 1 are defined by the following condition16
Eν
(
1{X1<T}
X1
)
+ γP({X1 = T}) 1
T
= 1.
For the proportional rule
UP (ϕpro,Pn(ν)) = 1
Eµ(mini∈N Xi) · Eν
(
1
X1
)(1 + o(1)). (16)
As in the proof of Proposition 6, symmetry of the problem implies pi(ϕ1,Pn(ν)) = nEµ
(
X1ϕ
1
1(X)
)
and
hence it is enough to estimate the contribution of one agent. We will calculate this expectation in two steps:
assuming first that X1 = z is fixed and averaging over Xj , j ≥ 2, and then averaging over z.
Consider Eµ
(
nX1ϕ
1
1(X) | X1 = z
)
. By the definition of the BH rule we get
n ·X1ϕ1(X)
∣∣
X1=z
=
XN\1
(n− 1) · 1Q + z ·
1−∑j:Xj<z 1n XN\j(n−1)Xj
|{j ∈ N : Xj = z}|/n · 1Q
′ , (17)
where Q is the event that
∑
j:Xj≤z
XN\j
n(n−1)Xj ≤ 1 (in other words, i belongs to the group of agents whose
share is given by the first line of equation (8)) and the event Q′ tells us that the share of agent 1 comes
from the second line of (8), i.e,
∑
j:Xj<z
XN\j
n(n−1)Xj < 1 <
∑
j:Xj≤z
XN\j
n(n−1)Xj .
Let us apply the strong law of large numbers to (17). Hence,
XN\1
n−1 converges to 1 almost surely,
and the sum
∑
j:Xj≤z
XN\j
n(n−1)Xj from the definition of Q converges to Eν
(
1
Xj
· 1{Xj≤z}
)
. Therefore, the first
summand of (17) tends to 1{z<T}, where T is defined as inf
{
T ′
∣∣Eν (1{Xj≤T ′}Xj
)
≥ 1
}
. Thus, the asymptotic
contribution of the first term to pi(ϕ1,P) is Pν({X1 < T}).
A similar application of the law of large numbers allows one to compute the contribution of the second
summand. We omit these computations.
C.2.2 Singularity at zero
Lemma 5: If a distribution ν has an atom at zero, then the BH and the Proportional rules collect the
optimal relative gain in the limit:
UP (ϕ1,P∞(ν)) = UP (ϕpro,P∞(ν)) = 1.
If there is no atom and ν has a continuous density f on (0, a], but this density is unbounded, f(x) =
λ
xα (1 + o(1)) as x→ +0 for some λ > 0 and α ∈ (0, 1), then
UP (ϕ1,P∞(ν)) = 1; however, UP (ϕpro,Pn(ν)) = Ω (n) .
16Formulas simplify for continuous distribution because P(Xi = T ) = 0 for all T and thus we can always pick γ = 0.
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In case of an atom, there is an agent i having Xi = 0 with high probability for large n. In such a
situation, both rules ϕ1 and ϕpro coincide with the Utilitarian rule and therefore their performance is 1.
The second statement is proved similarly to Lemma 4. For such ν, the expected value of the order
statistic X∗k for small k equals
(
1−α
λ
k
n
) 1
1−α · (1 + o(1)). Therefore, only the agent i with Xi = minj Xj
receives a bad under the BH rule with high probability, which gives UP (ϕ1,P∞(ν)) = 1. We omit a similar
argument for the Proportional rule.
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